The Surprisingly Constant Cost
of Landmine Impact Surveys
Landmine Impact Surveys involve survey teams that work with the local people to evaluate how landmines and unexploded ordnance affect daily lives. The Survey Action Center, United Nations and the
affected countries closely regulate this process to ensure the preservation of high standards.1
by Russell Gasser [ Humanitarian Technology Consulting Ltd. ]

Country
Afghanistan
Angola
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cambodia
Chad
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Iraq
Kosovo
Lebanon
Mauritania
Mozambique
Senegal
Somalia (all three phases)
Sudan
Thailand
Yemen

Year
Cost US$
Finished
2005
2007
2005
2003
2003
2002
2001
2004
2004
2006
2000
2003
2006
2001
No Data
2007
2009
2001
2000

3,004,494
6,778,163
669,800
1,236,000
2,006,730
1,360,000
1,842,000
2,291,992
4,029,672
No Data
111,000
1,500,000
No Data
2,272,000
No Data
1,906,900
No Data
1,656,000
1,645,000

Suspected
Post-LIS
Positives
Actually
Notes
Before Visits Impacted
4,655
2,365
4,384
1,988
99
60
610
480
2,939
1,366
13,908
2,776 No sampling
1,361
249
352
132
3,281
1,492
12,010
2,117 No sampling
No Data
No Data
1,065
306
No Data
No Data
2,057
791
No Data
No Data
496
482
Not aggregated
296
1,491
530
1,294
592

Table 1: Landmine Impact Survey data available from reports found on
http://www.sac-na.org.

Locals from landmine-affected communities draw community maps in Sudan.
All graphics courtesy of the author.

T

here is no obvious reason that a Landmine Impact Survey should cost the same in a small
European country like Bosnia and Herzegovina as it does in Chad or Thailand, but analysis of the 13
surveys with published costs shows that most surveys
do cost about the same amount.1 The two largest surveys
(Afghanistan and Angola) show more variation. This
analysis provides a way to deduce which of the past surveys were most cost-effective and could lead to ways of
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reducing LIS costs, while providing estimates for future
survey costs. Several surveys have been stopped and restarted due to funding shortfalls; therefore, a better cost
estimate would help in planning. It is important to remember this is not a rigorously predictive method but
an observation on worldwide experience.
Surveys are conducted as defined by international
protocols.2 This method probably accounts for the fairly
constant fixed costs, which are more than US$900,000

per country (See Figure 1 next page).
In addition to these fixed costs, a
variable component averages about
$800 for each community suspected
of being affected by landmines and/
or unexploded ordnance from the
start of the main data collection.
Before the main survey starts,
an LIS undertakes a Recollection
of the Opinion of Experts in the affected country that results in a list
of each community in which people are considered mine- and/or
UXO-affected. These communities are known as suspected positives. At this point in the process,
identifying potentially affected
communities may eliminate areas
within the country where there has
been no conflict. In Senegal, only
the southern province of Casamance has mined areas. In Thailand, mines only exist in certain
border areas. Thus far, every survey has found that a significant
proportion—roughly one-half—
of the suspected positives are not

mine- and/or UXO-affected, and
they then become false positives in
the survey data. (See Table 1.)
The correlation of total cost
against parameters—such as the
number of communities suspected, the number visited, the number
impacted, the number with mines,
UXO or victims, plus several different combinations of this data—was
analyzed for all available published
surveys. This assessment showed that
the best correlation is between the
overall cost and the number of suspected positives after the initial data
gathering and gazetteer preparation.
This result may be expected, as a survey team usually must visit each suspected positive community.
The correlation strength between
costs and suspected positives was
unexpected at the beginning of the
analysis. After eliminating the countries with missing data—including
Cambodia, which did not use a sampling methodology—a strong correlation of 0.8 for all surveys was found

to exist between the costs and suspected positives. (See Figure 1) The
fixed costs are surprisingly high,
meaning that the larger the survey,
the lower the cost per affected community. Although this varies from
one country to another, Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina were less costly than average,
whereas Angola, Eritrea, and Somalia were more expensive.3 These
increased costs may be explained
because the Angola LIS had to be
stopped and restarted, and Somalia’s survey was undertaken in three
phases.1
Future Outcomes

I suggest the mine-action community can draw some useful conclusions from this analysis:
1. The set of protocols closely regulating the LIS probably contributes to the relatively constant
cost. To improve efficiency and
cut costs, either the protocols
will need revision or future surveys will need to reduce the implementation of only the most
essential protocol elements. This
situation poses a dilemma: Reworking the protocols is likely to
be slow and expensive, but surveys not in compliance are less
likely to receive funding.
2. First estimates of the overall
cost of any future surveys can
be made. The number of surveys
that have run out of money suggest this exercise could be useful. A better measurement of the
likely cost-benefit before investing millions of dollars in a survey will result.
3. As cost is related to the number of suspected positives and
about half of these are found to
be false positives, it seems that
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The Rise in Terrorist Attacks
in the Western Sahara
The Mauritanian government is taking steps to prevent Al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts, including suicide
bombings and kidnappings in the region. Added to this threat are the explosives Al-Qaeda is able to obtain from landmines and unexploded ordnance scattered throughout the region after years of conflict in
Western Sahara. The United Nations Development Programme and various countries work to remove
these landmines and items of UXO, which is complicated by the lack of a Landmine Impact Survey.
by Lt. Colonel Mohamed Taghioullah Ould Nema [ Cabinet of the Mauritanian National Army ]

I
Figure 1: Landmine Impact Survey costs available from reports found on http://www.sac-na.org.

spending more time and effort
on the initial data collection
could be useful. If the number
of false positives can be reduced,
it is reasonable to assume that
overall costs will also decrease.
The Expert Opinion Collection
is usually a relatively small part
of the overall survey cost, so investing more resources on accurately collecting data early in
the process may be a useful approach to improving the LIS
cost-benefit ratio.
Conclusion

The initial data collection in an
LIS designates communities as potentially impacted by mines and
UXO. Distinguishing between suspected positives and false positives
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early in the process can reduce the
costs of the LIS. Based on analysis
of the correlation between costs and
suspected positives, evidence supports that efficient planning can reduce future survey expenses.
Given the small number of countries that still require an LIS, the
outcome of this analysis can give
better cost estimates to potential donors and identify the survey parts
where savings are most probable
in the future. At this stage, with so
many Landmine Impact Surveys
completed worldwide, rewriting the
protocols is likely not useful. Focusing on more efficient implementation and collecting core data in
different countries is a better route
to cost savings overall.
see endnotes page 83

notes from the field | the journal of ERW and mine action | spring 2011 | 15.1

Russell Gasser is an engineer who
became interested in mine action
while helping start a wheelchair repair workshop in Nicaragua in the late
1980s. He returned to Warwick University Development Technology Unit
in the U.K. in 1996, to write a Ph.D.
thesis about advanced technology research failing to deliver new demining tools and equipment. He received
his Ph.D. in 2000. After working for the
European Commission for three years,
he formed a consultancy, Humanitarian Technology Consulting Ltd., to provide mine-action program evaluation.
Russell Gasser, Ph.D.
Humanitarian Technology
Consulting Ltd.
Alzey 55232 / Germany
Tel: +49 6731 547 1501
Fax: +49 6731 547 1503
E-mail: RG@htc.eu.com

n 2009, while driving toward the
French embassy in Nouakchott,
Mauritania, I suddenly encountered a large blast. As I approached
the scene, I saw the worst sight I have
ever seen—the results of a suicide
bombing explosion. A 20-year-old
man had blown himself up trying to
kill two innocent embassy staff members while they were exercising. The
explosion split the man’s corpse into
three parts: His head to stomach was
dismembered and lying in the center
of the path; his lower part was thrown
about 12 meters (13 yards) away; and
pieces of his legs and other small bits
were strewn about on the pavement.
He committed this action during the
daytime, in front of everyone, and I
saw it myself.
Immediately following the attack,
fear paralyzed the people nearby. No
one wanted to move because they
were shocked and revolted by the explosion, and they were worried about
additional attacks.

Al-Qaeda’s Terrorism in Mauritania

This was the first suicide bombing in the country and the beginning
of many Al-Qaeda el Maghreb Islámi
(Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb)
attacks in Mauritania. For example,

the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott
was blown up by a grenade and assaulted by terrorist fighters, wounding three people. Three French
tourists were killed at Aleg (in the
deep country). Finally, AQIM killed
French captive Michel Germaneau
in retaliation for a French raid that
killed six AQIM militants.1 AQIM
had kidnapped Michel Germaneau
in Niger on the border with Mali and
Algeria, but where he was killed remains unknown.1,2
The Mauritanian government is
determined to fight terrorists. Many
specialized units in counterterrorism are stationed on the borders between Algeria, Mauritania and Mali.
The soldiers comprising these units
were highly trained in counterterrorism techniques by American
and French experts. In addition, the
Mauritanian government essentially
provided all the needed equipment
to the units (e.g., helicopters, vehicles, radar, an armored personnel
carrier, night-vision goggles, etc.).
Using technology and satellite
data, Mauritania’s counterterrorism team is gathering accurate intelligence extending beyond the
country’s borders to stop the extremists before they can launch new at-

A sentry guards the approach
road to a lightly guarded Mauritanian Army munitions supply point.
All photos courtesy of John Stevens,
PM/WRA, U.S. Department of State.

tacks. A joint tactical-operational
center was created in Algeria. This
center provides updated intelligence
information, assesses the security
situation and coordinates shared actions against AQIM.
Other bandits, arms traffickers and drug dealers are located in
the same region as the AQIM fighters and can collaborate with them
in terms of resupply or equipment
support, although AQIM mem-
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